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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Donald Rossignol, Jr. (hereinafter Mr. Rossignol) appeals from his conviction for 
three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age and one count of 
sexual abuse of a child. 
Course of Proceedings 
On November 15, 2005, Mr. Rossignol was charged via criminal complaint with 
three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and one connt of sexual abuse of a 
child. (R. p. 80-82.) The defendant was released on his own recognizance at his initial 
appearance. (R. p. 84.) He was bound over to the district court on the same charges after 
a preliminary hearing and a criminal information was filed. (R. p. 88-90, 106-108.) 
On March 2, 2006, the state filed a motion to increase bail because Mr. Rossignol 
had been charged in a separate case with two counts of perjury. (R. p. 158.) The 
allegations were that he had lied during his testimony in the Adjudicatory Hearing of the 
Child Protection case which was based on the same underlying facts as the criminal case. 
(R. p. 158-159.) He was ordered to appear on the motion on March 17, 2006. (R. p. 
219.) Mr. Rossignol failed to appear at that time and his release on his own 
recognizance was revoked and bail set in the amount of $25,000. (R. p. 292.) The jury 
trial set for June 12, 2006, was vacated. (R. p. 332.) 
In mid-July, 2006, Mr. Rossignol turned himself into authorities. (R. p. 369.) The 
jury trial was rescheduled for November 10, 2006. (R. p. 369.) On October 12, 2006, the 
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state moved to amend the information to include a persistent violator allegation. (R. p. 
397-398.) 
The matter proceeded to jury trial which ultimately resulted in a mistrial when the 
jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. (R. p. 922.) The trial was reset, and a 
second jury trial occurred with the jury ultimately finding Mr. Rossignol guilty as 
charged after deliberating over a period of four days. (R p. 1229-1230.) The jury then 
found Mr. Rossignol guilty of being a persistent violator. (R. p. 1230-123 I.) 
Mr. Rossignol was sentenced to forty years with the first thirty years fixed on 
each of the four counts of conviction, to run concurrent with each other. (R. p. 1318-
1319.) Fines and court costs totaling $1,154.00 were imposed along with a fine 
pursuant to LC. § 19-5307 in the amount of $20,000. (R. p. 1319, 1338.) Mr. Rossignol 
timely appeals. (R. p. 1325.) 
Statement of the Facts 
This case was the subject of two lengthy jury trials. However, the facts which 
matter for the resolution of this appeal are more succinctly described by the words of the 
parties and court because most issues below were extensively briefed and/or the subject 
of memorandum decisions by the court. Further, since many of these issues were 
addressed in between the two trials, they have the benefit of being able to refer to trial 
evidence that was actually presented. To begin with the background as explained by Mr. 
Rossignol: 
Donald Rossignol is the father of S.R. The child was born in 1997. Her 
parents separated when she was 18 months old. For five years, S.R. stayed 
with her mother (except during her mother's three month jail term) and 
had almost no contact with her father. During this time, S.R. 's older half 
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sister reported to Wyoming police that one of mother's boyfriends had 
sexually abused her. 
In July 2004, S.R. 'smother was killed in an automobile accident, and S.R. 
moved to live with her father and Nancy Rossignol, his new wife, in 
Moscow. From that date until September 16, 2005, there were no reported 
problems with Mr. Rossignol's care of her. On September 16, S.R. told a 
friend at school she had been molested by Mr. Rossignol. The friend told 
her mother, and the mother contacted the Department of Health and 
Welfare. On September 19, 2005, representatives from Health and Welfare 
went to the Rossignol home and interviewed S.R. The interview happened 
at a spot physically separated and out of earshot of Mr. and Mrs. 
Rossignol. S.R.'s only complaint against her father was that he was too 
strict. 
In response to the inquiry whether she felt unsafe, S.R. said she did, 
because men in striped suites were kidnapping sh1dents from her school-
something she described at length. This was completely false. 
Health and Welfare took no action except to recommend counseling for 
S.R., because of her fantasy kidnapping report. The Rossignols' promptly 
took steps to get such counseling. 
On September 28, 2005, S.R. made allegations of sexual abuse against her 
father at school, leading to further interviews with S.R. that day by police 
and Health and Welfare. S.R. was placed in shelter care the next day, and 
has been in foster case ever since. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions in Limine and in Response to State's 
Motions in Limine and Supplementary Motions in Limine, p. 3-4. (R. p. 573-574.) 
The court further explained the disclosures of September 28, 2005: 
The circumstances giving rise to S.R.'s version of events revolved around 
Mr. Rossignol's decision to take S.R. out of the Bear Buddy program at 
the Lena Whitman Elementary School. The program was devised to 
provide mentoring for children the school thought would benefit from it. 
Clara Hill, a high school senior, was S.R. 's Bear Buddy. 
When Mr. Rossignol told Ms. Hill he was taking S.R. out of the program, 
Ms. Hill wanted to have a final meeting with S.R. so she could say 
goodbye. The meeting eventually took place. Ms. Hill asked S.R. if her 
Dad had told her about leaving Bear Buddies and she said he had but she 
could not discuss it because it was about the "secret". Ms. Hill 
encouraged S.R. to tell her about the secret if it involved Bear Buddies. 
3 
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S.R. said she would if Ms. Hill promised not to tell anyone. Ms. Hill said 
she could not promise not to tell anyone. Ms. Hill said she could not 
promise not to tell some secrets, but it would be a good idea if she told 
her. S.R. then had Ms. Hill move to another, more private room and 
started whispering. She said her father was teaching her about massaging 
but that it was not really massaging and that it was not right. When Ms. 
Hill asked what she meant by that S.R. said her father massaged her in her 
"private places" and pointed to her chest and crotch. S.R. then asked Ms. 
Hill if she knew what a boy's private parts looked like and she said she 
did. S.R. then said, "well, my Dad makes me put my mouth on his." S.R. 
then said, "and there's the really bad thing too". When asked what she 
meant, S.R. said, "when we were in the living room and he showed me 
pictures of men and women having S-E-X", which she spelled because she 
said it was a bad word. She also said her Dad French-kissed her a lot. 
Ms. Hill took S.R. to Ms. Heidelberger's office [the elementary school 
counselor] where she repeated what she told Ms. Hill. Ms Heidelberger 
called in Heath and Welfare and the police. Detective Margaret 
Lembecker and social worker Rhonda Schultz, who then questioned S.R. 
as a part of an official investigation. 
Memorandum Decision, March 7, 2006, p. 6-7. (R. p. 1112-1113.) 
At trial, S.R. testified, as did Clara Hill. 1 The state also presented evidence of 
adult pornography and incest stories found on Mr. Rossignol's computer. 
Mr. Rossignol's defense was that the molestation did not occur and was 
fabricated. Components of the defense included that S.R. was mad at Mr. Rossignol, and 
that due to her abused background (when she lived with her mother and not Mr. 
Rossignol), she suffered from reactive affective disorder (RAD): 
In fact, some of the circumstances show S.R. had specific reasons to 
fabricate. S.R.'s allegations happened on September 28, 2005. About 
September 14 or 15, Mr. Rossignol gave away S.R.'s hamster, after she 
failed to take care of it. Throughout September there was friction between 
S.R. and her father over homework including a major confrontation after 
school September 27, less than 24 hours before she told Hill he had 
molested her. S.R. thus had two reasons to be angry at her father. And she 
1 As will be discussed below, the court at first ruled that the other interviews of that day 
were not admissible, but then allowed in the police interview during the state's rebuttal. 
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may have known from her own previous history with her sister that 
allegations of abuse would lead to official intervention. 
Evidence at the first trial also showed S.R. was at risk of suffering from 
the psychological phenomenon of detachment. This learned ability to 
detach easily from even the most central people in her life would take 
away the reluctance a normal child would have to tell lies that could 
deprive her of her father. 
Memorandum Opposing State's Motions in Limine on Retrial, p. 9. (R. p. 1020). 
The defense also introduced evidence which showed that the victim had previous 
sexual knowledge to demonstrate a potential source for her sexual knowledge other than 
the alleged conduct of Mr. Rossignol. The court heard extensive argument about this 
topic, but in short, the defense had police reports alleging that S.R.'s sister C.B. was the 
victim of sexual abuse in 2000 (reported in 2004) while living with her mother in 
Wyoming.2 (R. p. 794.) 
The following is the offer of proof, which accurately describes the trial evidence 
because the police reports and interview were introduced since C.B. was unavailable: 
A) Detective E. Hernandez, from Las Vegas Nevada, will testify that he 
interviewed the complainant's half-sister, C.B. C.B. told Detective 
Hernandez 1) that she had been molested by James Austin, her mother's 
former boyfriend, and 2) that she had told the complainant that. C.B. 
added, "I talk to her about everything. She knows everything about me." 
B) Retired Lt. Harold Newborough of the Carbon County, Wyoming 
Sheriffs Dept. will testify that C.B. told him in January 2004 that James 
Austin had molested her. According to his report, C.B. told him Austin 
"used his thumb to massage her vagina," which she described as the "hole 
between my legs." 
Other testimony will show S.R. was in the household with C.B. during the 
period of the alleged abuse, the time of the report (January 2004), the 
years intervening, and the time following until their mother's death, and 
that she was a close companion of C.B. 
2 C.B. later lived in Las Vegas and was interviewed there, which is why the police from 
two different places were involved. 
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Defendant's Memorandum on Admissibility of Police Testimony Concerning Statements 
by C.B. at p. 1-2. (R. p. 759-760.) 
The primary reasons the statements were relevant according to the defense was 
because: 
the words C.B. used to describe the abuse and her vagina are words 
S.R. used when alleging abuse by her father. This would permit an 
inference that S.R. heard these terms in the sex abuse context from C.B. 
and could have used them to fabricate an account of sex abuse, even if 
S.R. had had no direct experience of sex abuse. 
Defendant's Memorandum on Admissibility of Police Testimony Concerning Statements 
by C.B. at p. 3. (R. 761.) 
Finally, since it is not at issue here it will not be detailed, but the defense also 
put on various family members (including step-mother, Mrs. Rossignol) describing their 
contacts with S.R. These descriptions included S.R.'s interactions with Mr. Rossignol 
(which did not indicate any fear of him) and that they saw no evidence of any sexual 
abuse. 
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ISSUES 
I. 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT GA VE AN ERRONEOUS 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
IL 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF MR. 
ROSSIGNOL'S FLIGHT 
III. 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
ADULT PORNOGRAPHY AND INCEST STORIES FOUND ON MR. 
ROSSIGNOL'S COMPUTER 
IV. 
WHETHER MR. ROSSIGNOL WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS WHEN THE 
COURT ADMITTED EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD EARLIER RULED 
INADMISSIBLE AND THE DEFENSE RELIED ON THE PRE-TRIAL RULING 
V. 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE CHILD-RELATED 
COMMUNICATIONS EXCEPTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGIST-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE AND SO PROHIBITED 
EXAMINATION OF THE VICTIM'S PSYCHOLOGIST 
VI. 
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT GA VE AN ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION 
A. Standard of review. 
The standard ofreview for this issue was explained in State v. Stricklin, 136 
Idaho 264, 32 P.3d 158 (Ct.App. 2001): 
Where the trial court gives a reasonable doubt instruction other than the 
approved instruction, this Court's review focuses upon whether the 
instruction that was given to the jury misstated the law or was so 
confusing and argumentative as to mislead the jury. 
Id., p. 267. 
As further explained in State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003): 
Constitutional issues and the propriety of jury instructions are questions of 
law over which this Court exercises free review. If a reasonable doubt 
instruction is found to have lessened the state's burden of proof, the error 
is never harmless error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281, 113 
S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 190 (1993) ("[T]he essential 
connection to a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' factual finding cannot be 
made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the 
burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings"). 
Id., p. 273 (internal citations omitted). 
B. The requested and given jury instruction. 
The Idaho pattern jury instruction for reasonable doubt provides as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This 
presumption places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a defendant, although accused, 
begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against the defendant. 
If, after considering all the evidence and my instructions on the law, you 
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have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, you must return a 
verdict of not guilty. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, 
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral 
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state of the 
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot 
say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the 
charge. 
ICJI 103. 
The alternative Idaho pattern jury instruction for reasonable doubt provides as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be 
innocent. The presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state 
has that burden throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to 
prove [his] [her] innocence, nor does the defendant ever have to produce 
any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt 
based on reason and common sense. It is the kind of doubt which would 
make an ordinary person hesitant to act in the most important affairs of his 
or her own life. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable 
doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
ICJI 103A. 
The defense submitted the alternative instruction above as its proposed jury 
instruction. (R. p. 1096.) 
The jury instruction actually given by the court was as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. Thus, 
although accused, the defendant begins this trial with a clean slate. In 
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addition the defendant has a constitutional right not to testify and you are 
to draw absolutely no inferences against him/her if he/she exercises his/her 
right to remain silent. 
The State must prove all the material elements of the offense charged in 
the Information to be true beyond a reasonable doubt before the 
defendant can be found guilty. In order to help you in your duties as jurors 
I am going to outline for you the elements of the crime for which the 
defendant has been charged. 
The State must prove that on unknown dates between January, 2005 and 
September, 2005 in Idaho that Mr. Rossignol did commit lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen years of age as described in three of the counts 
against him and that he sexually abused a child as described in the 
remaining count. 
It is not necessary for the state to establish every fact and circumstance put 
in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is necessary to sustain a 
conviction that the facts and circumstances in evidence, when taken 
together, establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the material 
elements of offense [sic] that I have outlined. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, 
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral 
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is the state of the 
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot 
say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the 
charge. 
Comt's instruction No. 3. (R. p. 1189-1190.) 
C. The court erred by giving a deficient reasonable doubt instruction which misled 
and confused the jury. 
It is well established that a deficient reasonable doubt jury instruction violates 
both the Fifth and tl1e Sixth Amendments. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 
S.Ct. 2078 (1993). Appellant asserts that the district court's instruction was deficient in 
that it misled and confused the jury since it cobbled together various statements of law 
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and also left out a vital concept regarding the burden of proof which had the effect of 
lessening the state's burden. 
In the trial court, m addition to submitting the proposed jury instruction 
discussed above which was not given by the court, the defense made various other 
specific objections to the court's instructions. (Tr. p. 715, 1455-1456.) Most important 
was an objection to the "moral evidence" and "moral certainty" language pursuant to 
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (!990). Appellant acknowledges that the Idaho pattern 
instruction containing this language has been upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court as 
recognized in Stricklin, supra. Therefore, while Appellant raises this issue on appeal, he 
will not unnecessarily belabor it except to point out the jury was specifically confused as 
to the moral certainty language contained therein, as will be discussed below. 
Furthermore, in our case, the jury instruction as given by the court was obviously 
not the pattern instruction although for some reason the court kept referring to it as if it 
was. While the first sentence and last paragraph of the instruction was from the pattern 
instruction, nothing else was. 
To begin with, Appellant takes issue with paragraph four of the court's 
instruction which starts · with the language that it is not necessary that every fact and 
circumstance on behalf of the State be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant 
recognizes that a similar challenge has previously been rejected in Stricklin, supra, 
however, that case is distinguishable. Stricklin held as follows: 
Stricklin argues that the district court gave a jury instruction (instruction 
20), which diminished the state's burden to less than beyond a reasonable 
doubt and violated his right to a fair trial. Instruction 20 states: 
It is not necessary that every fact and circumstance put in evidence 
on behalf of the State be established beyond a reasonable doubt, 
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but it is necessary to sustain a conviction that all facts and 
circumstances in evidence, when taken together, establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt the material elements of the offense charged. 
In addition to the above instructions, the jury was instructed that their 
decision had to be unanimous and that the state bore the burden of proof: 
The jury will bear in mind that the burden is always on the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential 
element of any offense which is essentially included-which is 
necessarily included in the crime charged, but the law never 
imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of 
calling any witness or producing any evidence. 
Taken together, we conclude that instruction 20 did no more than instruct 
the jury that the state's burden of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-related 
to the sum of the evidence submitted on each essential element of the 
offenses charged, not to every isolated fact and circumstance presented. 
As such, instruction 20 is a true and accurate statement of the law. 
Strickin has failed to indicate how this instruction denied him a fair trial. 
Id., p. 268-269. 
What saved the instruction in Stricklin is absent from our case, to wit, another 
instruction which clarified the offending instruction. Unlike Stricklin, our jury was not 
instructed that the law never imposed upon a defendant the burden or duty of calling any 
witness or producing any evidence. 
In our case, the reasonable doubt instruction began correctly by explaining that 
the defendant is presumed innocent and begins the trial with a clean state. But then, 
instead of instructing that the defendant is never required to prove his innocence or to 
produce any evidence at all, the instruction instead states that the defendant has a right 
not to testify. While this is of course a true statement of law, it is not a substitute for a 
statement that the defendant does not need to call any witnesses or produce any evidence. 
Likewise, while later in the instructions the court again states that the defendant has the 
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right not to testify (R. p. 1211), a repetition of that principle is still not the same as 
instructing the jury that the defendant need not produce any evidence at all. 
Then, to add to the problem caused by the jury not being instructed that the 
defendant need not produce any evidence, the instruction further confuses this issue. 
The last paragraph of the court's instruction (which is from the pattern instruction) 
discusses the jury's "comparison and consideration of all the evidence." The defense 
objected to this below: 
The word comparison suggests that the Defendant does have a burden of 
proof and that the jury is to compare the State's evidence with the 
Defendant's evidence, rather than just simply ask the question does all the 
evidence in the case prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Tr. p. 1456, Ins. 18-23. 
Thus, for all these reasons above, Appellant asserts that the court mis-described 
the burden of proof in this instruction or, at the very least, confused and misled the jury 
as to the burden. 
The court further confused matters in paragraphs two, three, and four when it 
claimed to be outlining the elements of the crimes which must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt but then did not do so. In paragraph two the court instructs that the 
state must prove all the material elements of the offense and it will assist the jury by 
outlining the elements. But paragraph three simply provides that the state must prove 
that Mr. Rossignol committed lewd conduct with a minor and sexually abused a child as 
described in the counts. Even though the court has clearly not described the elements of 
the offenses, at the end of paragraph four the court repeats that it has outlined the 
material elements of the offense. So while later in the instructions the jury is actually 
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instructed as to what the elements really are, it had already been told that what the state 
must prove is an abbreviated version. 
Finally, this is a case where the confusion of the jury is clear from the record. On 
the third day of deliberations, the jury sent out a note which asked the following 
questions: (R. p. 1223.) 
1) In layman's terms could you provide us with additional information as 
to what constitutes reasonable doubt 
2) Could yon give us further interpretation as to the meaning of 
"abiding conviction, to a moral certainty" 
Court's exhibit 52. 
The court stated that it was not surprised at the note because it is a convoluted 
definition (of reasonable doubt), but it is the Supreme Court's definition. (Tr. p. 1711.) 
The court later said that the jury is confused as to what the instruction means and while 
the court gave it because it was approved by the Supreme Court, the court had earlier 
stated that it thought the instruction was convoluted and difficult to understand. (Tr. p. 
1716-1717.) 
At this point, the court was willing to give the alternative IDJI instruction 
103(A), but now the defense did not want it in part because giving a second instruction 
at this late time would be confusing to the jury.3 (Tr. p. 1714.) The state agreed with 
the defense's concerns including the inability to argue to the jury about the new 
3 Defense counsel also made arguments about the instruction which appear to be 
inconsistent with his earlier position, but nevertheless confirmed that by proposing that 
the court not provide another instruction and instead merely advise the jury that they 
must be guided by the instruction they already had, he did not mean to waive any of his 
earlier objections, and the court agreed. (Tr. p. 1714-1716, 1718-1719.) 
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instruction, but it would not object if the court wanted to give the instruction. (Tr. p. 
1717.) Ultimately, the court advised the jury that "[t]he definition of 'reasonable doubt' 
that you have is the Idaho Supreme Court's approved definition and is the one you must 
follow in your deliberations." Court Exhibit 53. 
Obviously, despite the court's statements to the contrary, the given instruction 
was not even close to either pattern instruction. It mis-described the burden of proof and 
was otherwise confusing and misleading. Most importantly, it in fact confused the jury. 
Since as explained above, a deficient reasonable doubt instruction cannot be harmless, 
Mr. Rossignol's convictions must be reversed. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
MR. ROSSIGNOL'S FLIGHT 
A. Standard ofreview. 
The Idaho Supreme Court explained the standard of review for this issue in State 
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,965 P.2d 174 (1998): 
Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid 
prosecution requires the trial judge to conduct a two-part analysis. First, 
the judge must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401, 
and second, the judge must determine that the probative value of the 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
This Court reviews the question of relevancy in the admission of evidence 
de novo. A court's decision that evidence is more probative than 
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Id., p. 819 (internal citations omitted). 
15 
B. The arguments and rulings on flight. 
As explained earlier, the state filed a motion to increase bail because Mr. 
Rossignol had been charged in a separate case with two counts of perjury. (R. p. 158.) 
The allegations of perjury were that he had lied during his testimony in the Adjudicatory 
Hearing of the Child Protection case which was based on the same underlying facts as the 
criminal case. (R. p. 158-159.) He was ordered to appear on the motion on March 17, 
2006, but failed to appear. (R. p. 219,292.) The jury trial was vacated. (R. p. 332.) 
In mid-July, 2006, Mr. Rossignol turned himself into authorities. (R. p. 369.) 
Before the first trial, the court ruled that the evidence of flight was admissible. 
The defense had argued that he did not flee at the first opportunity and he appeared at 
many hearings concerning the Child Protective Act proceedings. Also, the defense argued 
that the circumstances surrounding his departure from the state do not clearly point to one 
particular reason and that he could not explain his flight without referring to the perjury 
charge. The court ruled as follows: 
Mr. Rossignol fled from the state while very serious charges were pending 
against him and a trial date was quickly approaching. The maximum 
penalty for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor is life in prison. The 
maximum penalty for perjury is fourteen years. The new allegations of 
perj,ury were directly related to the Child Protection Act proceedings 
which arose out of the charges at issue here. It is objectively unreasonable 
to conclude that the perjury charges, as a discreet event, rather than the 
convergence of events relating to the child sex abuse charges, gave rise to 
Mr. Rossignol's flight. Mr. Rossignol's flight from the county is therefore 
relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. 
Memorandum Decision, p. 6. (R. p. 785.) 
Significantly, in the very next section of its Memorandum Decision, the court 
held that evidence of Mr. Rossignol's alleged perjury at the Child Protection Act 
proceedings is not admissible as direct evidence and reserved until trial whether the 
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evidence would be admissible for impeachment purposes. (R. p. 785.) The allegations of 
perjury stemmed from what the court called Mr. Rossignol's version of the details of his 
forgery conviction in Wyoming and the prison term he served for it, and whether or not 
his new wife had legally adopted S.R. (R. p. 787 .) The court held that these were 
collateral to the child molestation charges and deceptive responses to these particular 
questions could reasonably be attributed to considerations other than his consciousness of 
guilt about the pending charges. (R. p. 787.) The court did hold that evidence of the 
forgery conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes under I.R.E. 609(a). (R. p. 
788.) 
After the first trial, both sides filed more motions in limine in attempts to either 
maintain the court's original rulings on various issues or to urge it to reconsider. As to 
the flight issue, the defense argued that the evidence produced at the first trial shows that 
the flight was caused by factors other than consciousness of guilt and fear with regard to 
the instant criminal charges. (R. p. 942-943.) According to the defense, the testimony at 
the first trial showed that Mr. Rossignol was afraid that his bail would be raised to an 
amount he could not post, and he was afraid that his wife would be charged while he 
was in custody and therefore unable to help her much. (R. p. 944.) The defense again 
argued that he did not flee at the time of the accusation itself in September of 2005 or 
when charged in November of 2005. (R. p. 944.) It was only after the separate perjury 
charges and motion to increase his bail were filed on March 2, 2006, that he failed to 
appear. (R. p. 944.) At the same time, his wife, Nancy Rossignol, testified that they 
understood the prosecutor to say in the Child Protection trial that she could be criminally 
complicit in his alleged crimes against S.R. (R. p. 944.) Thus, the couple faced the 
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prospect of Mr. Rossignol going to jail because he would be unable to make bail, and 
Mrs. Rossignol facing criminal prosecution without his assistance. (R. p. 944.) 
The defense continued by arguing that given the length of time that Mr. Rossignol 
had to flee after being charged and the proximity of his flight to the motion to increase 
his bail and the complications involving his wife, it is entirely reasonable that his reason 
for fleeing stemmed from the later issues, and not because of his guilty knowledge or the 
upcoming trial. (R. p. 944.) There was nothing about the events in March to indicate 
that the upcoming trial was a precipitating event to the flight. (R. p. 944.) Although the 
perjury charges and the problems they caused arose out the alleged molestation, they are 
legally separate and the subject of separate legal proceedings. (R. p. 944-945.) 
Therefore, the evidence of flight did not show a relation to the defendant's consciousness 
of guilt of the crime charged. (R. p, 945.) When he fled, Mr. Rossignol had immediate 
concerns about being free from imprisonment and for the safety of his wife in addition to 
whatever background fears he felt about the pending molestation charges. (R. p. 945.) 
Therefore, concluded the defense, the relevance of flight to the molestation charges is 
low and the risk of prejudice significant. (R. p. 945.) 
The court confirmed its earlier ruling that the evidence of flight was admissible 
for the reasons as stated in its original Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. p. 1108.) 
C. The court erred by admitting the evidence of flight. 
The parties and court below focused on three Idaho appellate cases concerning 
evidence of flight. The first is State v. Cootz, 110 Idaho 807, 718 P.2d 1245 (Ct.App. 
1986). There, the defendant was on parole when he committed his new offenses and was 
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returned to the penitentiary to await trial. He escaped, was later captured, and returned for 
trial on the new charges. The district court allowed in evidence of the escape, but 
fearful that it would disclose the defendant's prior felony conviction, the judge limited 
the testimony to disclose only that he had escaped from a confinement facility. The 
Court of Appeals held that the evidence of the escape should not have been allowed. 
Escape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting 
evidence of other crimes. Such evidence is admissible because it may 
indicate a consciousness of guilt. However, this inference is seriously 
weakened when a defendant harbors motives for escape other than guilt of 
the charged offense. Such is the case here. When he escaped Cootz had 
twelve years remaining on a prior sentence and his parole had been 
revoked. An inference of guilty knowledge could be drawn, as well as an 
inference that Cootz fled to avoid his remaining sentence. In State v. 
Jeffers, supra, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed this issue: 
We recognize that authority exists in other jurisdictions that "the 
circumstances must be such as to exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt of the offense 
charged," in order for the fact of escape to be admissible at trial. 
[Citations omitted.] There is more recent authority which indicates 
that evidence of escape may be introduced in a criminal case, 
despite multiplicity of pending charges. [Citations omitted.] 
The admissibility of evidence of an escape is not determinative of 
the weight to be afforded to that fact, and the accused may go 
forward with the evidence to explain any alternative reasons he 
may have had for the escape .... 
[T]he existence of alternative reasons for the escape goes to the 
weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. 
Id., 661 P.2d at 1116. As noted in Jeffers, not all states permit use of 
escape evidence where the defendant faces incarceration or punishment 
for charges other than the ones on which he is being tried. See generally 
29 AM.ruR.2d EVIDENCE § 286 (1967) and Annot., 3 A.LR.4th 1085 
(1981). 
We reserve for another day the question of admissibility of escape where 
there are alternative inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. 
Assuming such evidence is admissible in this state-a question that has not 
been decided by our Supreme Court-we believe it was an abuse of 
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discretion to admit it in this case. The trial court in its discretion should 
not admit evidence when its questionable probative value is outweighed 
by its unfair prejudicial effect. 
Here, the relevance of the escape evidence was undermined by the fact 
that Cootz was serving the remainder of a prior felony conviction when he 
escaped. To make matters worse, this fact was kept from the jury by 
admission of only the fact that Cootz escaped from a "confinement 
facility." Thus, the jury was unable to weigh the other possible motives for 
escape. The only way to cure this problem would have been to admit 
Cootz's prior felony conviction, the very evidence the court wanted to 
keep out. When the slight relevance of this evidence is balanced against its 
prejudicial effect, any probative value is overcome. 
Id., p. 814-815 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added). 
The next case is State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 834 P.2d 323 (Ct.App. 1992). 
The district court allowed in evidence of the defendant's two failures to appear to show 
guilty conscience or knowledge because pursuant to Cootz, there was no indication that 
he failed to appear for any other reason. The Court of Appeals upheld the admission of 
the evidence because at the time of the ruling on its admissibility, the defendant had 
offered no explanation for the failures to appear. On appeal, the defendant conceded that 
the evidence was relevant, but argued that it should have been excluded nonetheless, a 
position rejected because he had pointed to no unfair prejudice. 
Finally, in State v. Moore, supra, evidence of flight to another state was admitted 
and its admission upheld: 
Moore argues that his actions could not have amounted to flight because 
they occurred weeks after the charged conduct and he did not conceal his 
whereabouts. To constitute flight, it is not necessary that Moore's 
departure must have been both immediate and covert. "For departure to 
take on the legal significance of flight, there must be other circumstances 
present and unexplained which, together with the departure, reasonably 
justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness of guilt and in an 
effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution based on that guilt." Wrenn at 
509, 584 P.2d at 1234. The holding in Wrenn contains no requirement that 
the departure be either immediate or concealed. In the present case, upon 
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learning that police wanted to talk to him about the alleged sexual abuse of 
S.K., Moore immediately left Idaho and returned to Oregon, giving his 
employer a false reason to explain his sudden departure. These actions 
reasonably imply a consciousness of guilt and a desire to flee the 
jurisdiction in order to avoid prosecution. We therefore agree with the 
district court that the evidence was relevant and so properly admitted. 
Id., p. 819. 
Appellant first asserts that this Court should follow the lead of the other states 
mentioned in Cootz which do not permit use of escape evidence where the defendant 
faces incarceration or punishment for charges other than the ones on which he is being 
tried.4 In the alternative, assuming arguendo that the evidence is relevant, Appellant 
asserts that it nevertheless should have been excluded under I.R.E. 403 as being unfairly 
prejudicial. 
Our case is like Cootz rather than Friedley or Moore for several reasons. First, in 
our case, as in Cootz, there was clearly an additional reason or reasons for the flight. In 
fact, as argued by defense counsel, given the timing, his flight was actually from the 
perjury charges and so any consciousness of guilt would go to that case, not the instant 
case. 
But more importantly, in our case, as in Cootz, an important alternative 
explanation for the flight could not be brought to the attention of the jury to explain the 
flight because that would have itself caused unfair prejudice. As explained above, the 
court ruled that evidence of the perjury charges was nol admissible as direct evidence, 
and so to completely explain his flight, Mr. Rossignol would have been required to 
disclose to the jury evidence which was too prejudicial to be admitted on its own. 
4 Appellant asserts that flight evidence is no longer relevant where there are multiple 
reasons for the flight and thus not admissible under I.R.E. 404(b ). 
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Further, the perjury was based mostly on his Wyoming conviction, which again, was only 
admissible for impeachment. 
As in Cootz, with only limited information, the jury could not weigh the other 
possible motives for the flight. The only way to cure the problem would be to have 
admitted evidence of Mr. Rossignol's other pending legal case, the very evidence the 
court wanted to keep out. This would have further required admission of the evidence of 
the prior felony conviction, which was also not directly admissible. So as in Cootz, 
when the slight relevance of the evidence of flight is balanced against its prejudicial 
effect, any probative value is overcome. 
Finally, the statement in Moore, that in order for a departure to be flight it does 
not have to be immediate or covert, does not require any different result in our case. In 
addition to not concerning multiple reasons for flight, the real issue in Moore is not 
present in our case. The defendant in Moore attempted to time his departure from the 
charged conduct, not the police's desire to talk to him, to show that it was not flight. In 
our case, the departure (which was far removed from both) was obviously flight. 
Therefore, our issue was not whether the departure was flight, but whether the flight 
showed a consciousness of guilt of the instant charges given everything else involved. 
To summarize, Appellant asserts that the evidence of flight is not relevant where 
he is facing incarceration on other charges. Alternatively, Appellant asserts that even if 
relevant, the evidence of flight should not have been admitted due to the unfair prejudice 
of not being able to explain all the possible motives for the flight without admitting 
otherwise inadmissible evidence. 
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D. The admission of the evidence was not harmless error. 
The test for harmless error is whether a reviewing court can find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission 
of the challenged evidence. State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113, 106 P.3d 436 (2005). 
Appellant asserts that the error in admitting this evidence cannot be considered to 
be harmless. 5 This is because this was a very close case, which is best shown by the 
fact that the first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury could not wianimously reach a 
verdict, and then in the second trial, the jury deliberated over a period of four days 
before finally reaching a guilty verdict. 
Other than the evidence which is being challenged on appeal, the only evidence 
against Mr. Rossignol was the word of the accuser. Therefore, if any piece of 
challenged evidence was excluded, there can be no finding that the jury would have 
reached the same result without the admission of the challenged evidence, since it was 
barely able to reach a guilty verdict with it all. Accordingly, the convictions should be 
reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
5 Actually, Appellant asserts that this is true for every error discussed in this brief 
( except for the reasonable doubt instruction which is not subject to harmless error review) 
for the same reasons, therefore this argument will apply to all issues and will not be 
unnecessarily repeated. 
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III. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
ADULT PORNOGRAPHY AND INCEST STORIES FOUND ON MR. 
ROSSIGNOL'S COMPUTER 
A. Standard of review. 
The relevant standard of review was explained in State v. Kremer, 144 Idaho 286, 
160 P.3d 443 (Ct.App. 2007): 
Ordinarily, evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the defendant's character in order to show the 
defendant acted in conformity with that character. I.R.E. 404(b ); .... 
However, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, including 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, identity, or a general 
plan. I.R.E. 404(b) .... 
To determine the admissibility of other act evidence, the trial court is to 
engage in a two-tiered analysis. First it must determine whether the 
evidence is relevant for a purpose other than propensity. Second, if the 
evidence is deemed relevant for an appropriate purpose, the court must 
determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403; .... We 
exercise free review as to the district court's relevancy determination; 
however, in regards to its balancing of the prejudicial effect and probative 
nature of the evidence, we will conclude error occurred only upon finding 
an abuse of discretion .... 
Id., 160 P.3d at p. 446 (internal citations omitted). 
B. The background and court's rulings. 
Mr. Rossignol's computer, which was seized by police, contained adult 
pornography (and incest stories, which will be discussed in the section below). The court 
allowed the adult pornography into evidence because it corroborated S.R.'s testimony. 
(R. p. 791.) As further explained by the defense in its memorandum, the basis for 
admission of the pictures was because the presence of the pictures on Mr. Rossignol's 
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computer corroborated S.R. 's testimony that she was shown pictures of sex on a 
computer. (R. p. 945-946.) However, according to the defense, S.R. 's actual trial 
testimony at the first trial shows the pictures do not corroborate that testimony in any 
significant way, and therefore, since the material is otherwise highly prejudicial, it 
should now be excluded. (R. p. 945-946.) 
SR specifically testified that: I) Mr. Rossignol asked her to look at 
pictures on his computer, 2) they were pictures of naked men and women 
having sex and pictures of what she alleges she was asked to do, 3) the 
pictures show naked men and women lying together "stomach on 
stomach" and "going up and down" (Transcript of trial, p. 8-9, Attachment 
B), and 4) the pictures she saw on the computer were like what Mr. 
Rossignol did to her, though the only example stated was fellatio 
("sucking dick") (Trial Transcript, p. 19, Attachment C). 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions in Limine on Retrial, p. 8. (R. p. 947.) 
The defense argued that S.R. thus testified to generic descriptions of copulation 
and fellatio with no distinguishing features. (R. p. 947.) She did not testify to having 
seen particular pictures. (R. p. 947.) According to the defense, a common thread of 
various cases allowing in pornography and/or stories is that a jury may be shown a 
particular item if it corroborates a witnesses' testimony about seeing a particular item, 
but no such connection can be drawn between the pictures on the computer and S.R's 
testimony. (R. p. 948.) 
The pictures are, at best, examples of the types of images S.R. might have 
been shown. It should not be difficult for the jury to image such scenes 
without being provided examples. 
In its Memorandum, the Court did not weigh the relevance of the pictures 
against the possibility of prejudice, as required by I.R.E. 403(b ). The 
danger of such prejudice is overwhelming here. The pornography, once 
admitted, inevitably draws the jury's focus. Whatever the ostensible 
purpose for the evidence being admitted, it inevitably makes Mr. 
Rossignol look like a pervert. Even though no connection is drawn 
between a specific picture and S.R.'s alleged abuse, the jury is led to 
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imagine S.R. as acting out the sexual situation of the picture. Some of the 
material, however legal, must shock and anger some of the jury. In short, 
whatever slight relevance the material might have is outweighed by the 
unfair prejudice. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions in Limine on Retrial, p. 9-10 (internal 
citations omitted). (R. p. 948-949.) 
C. The court erred by admitting the adult pornography. 
Even assuming arguendo that the adult pornography corroborates S.R.'s 
testimony that she was shown pornography, this still does not mean that the pictures 
themselves should have been admitted into evidence. Appellant asserts that, at most, the 
court should have permitted evidence describing the pornography found without 
admitting the actual pictures. The unfair prejudice to Mr. Rossignol would be greatly 
diminished if the jury merely learned about the pornography found on the computer 
without being shown it. 
Had S.R. specifically identified some particular picture as something which she 
had seen, then perhaps that particular picture could be admitted. But as argued below, she 
could not identify any particular picture, and so the pictures introduced were just 
examples of what she may haye seen. 6 Since the jury could easily understand the nature 
of what was depicted in the pictures without actually seeing them, the only purpose in 
showing them the actual pictures was to shock and disgust the jury. As further argued 
below, even without this sort of evidence, a child sex abuse case tests the jury's ability to 
6 As to the graphics of movies found on the computer that the state was allowed to admit 
over objection, they were not even examples of what S.R. may have seen because there 
does not appear to be any allegation that she was shown movies. (Tr. p. 864-866.) 
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decide the case on reason rather than emotion. The very nature of the charge triggers 
prejudice against the defendant and these images would fan the flames of that 
prejudice. (Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 163.7) 
To summarize, assuming arguendo that corroboration was the true reason for the 
introduction of the pornography, this could have been sufficiently accomplished by a 
description of the pictures. But since the pictures themselves were admitted, Mr. 
Rossignol suffered unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403. 
D. The incest stores and the court's ruling. 
As succinctly explained by the defense: 
Mr. Rossignol's computer also contained about eleven incest stories, 
according to the State's computer forensics expert's trial testimony. Three 
of these stories-the only ones which concerned father/daughter incest-
were admitted at trial. Before trial, the defense was only aware of the three 
stories that concerned father/daughter incest. 
In its Memorandum, the Court admitted these three stories, like the 
pictures, because they corroborated S.R.'s testimony. This has proved 
incorrect, as S.R. at no point testified to being read these stories, or 
otherwise interacting with them. They do not corroborate her testimony. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions in Limine on Retrial, p. 10. (R. p. 949.) 
In the Memorandum Decision being referred to above, the court did simply rule 
that the incest stories would corroborate S.R.'s testimony. (R. p. 791.) However, in its 
tentative oral ruling, the court did acknowledge that the incest stories were prejudicial, 
but did not think they were unfairly prejudicial. (Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 172.) Even the 
prosecutor admitted that that the danger of unfair prejudice is higher with the incest 
7 The November 8, 2006, motion hearing appears in its own volume apart from the eight 
volumes of consecutively number transcripts. 
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stories than it is with the adult pornography, but he still did not think that it outweighed 
the probative value. (Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 168.) 
The defense had also earlier argued that whatever arguable relevance the evidence 
had, it was much more likely that a jury would interpret such stores as evidence that the 
defendant has a general propensity to commit incest, contrary to I.R.E. 404(b ). (R. p. 
598.) The defense opined that the common social disgust for incest would likely 
overwhelm any attempts to place them in context. (R. p. 598.) Later, the defense 
argued that: 
... the prejudice flowing from introduction of these stories is striking. 
Unburied from internet files, printed and displayed for the jury, they take 
on a substantial form they apparently never had in Mr. Rossignol's life 
and seem to become evidence that he is a pedophile. This is unfairly 
prejudicial predisposition evidence excluded by Rules 404(b) and 403. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions in Limine on Retrial, p. 12. (R. 951.) 
E. The court erred by admitting the incest stories. 
Appellant asserts that admission of the incest stories was error under both l.R.E. 
404 and I.R.E. 403. Of course, I.R.E. 404 prohibits the admission of other bad acts to 
show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith. Appellant asserts that whatever 
the rubric used to justify the admission of the incest stories, it was propensity evidence 
pure and simple. As explained above, since S.R. did not testify that she was exposed to 
incest stories, their existence on the computer did not corroborate her testimony as the 
adult pornography arguably did. Rather, the incest stories were admitted simply to 
show that Mr. Rossignol had a propensity to commit incest. 
Alternatively, even if some legitimate reason could be found under I.R.E. 404(b) 
to admit the incest stories, they still should have been excluded under l.R.E. 403 as 
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unfairly prejudicial. This is because regardless of the legal justification for their 
admission, the jury could not possibly have done anything other than use them as 
improper propensity evidence. 
Appellant further asserts that even if the fact of the stories were admitted, the 
stories themselves should not have been. As with the pictures, the admission of the 
stories themselves would do nothing more than disgust the jury and inflame its passions. 
But more importantly, the acts depicted in the stories went far beyond the allegations in 
this case. The three stories admitted were entitled "Even in the Best Families," "Oh, 
Adrienne, Sweet Adrienne," and most significantly, "Make me pregnant Daddy." 
(Respectively State's exhibits 7 and 7a, 9 and 9a, and 8 and 8a.) The plot of the last 
story is self evident and obviously depicts bad acts far surpassing that of any allegations 
in our case. In fact, Appellant asserts that the title of this story should not even have been 
disclosed to the jury. Moreover, while there were no allegations of intercourse in our 
case, two of the three stories admitted into evidence involved incestuous intercourse. 
(Exhibits 8 and 9.) Further, two of the three incest stories involved the participation of 
the mother as well as the father, which again, goes well beyond our allegations. (Exhibits 
7 and 8.) 
So given the extremely inflammatory nature of the content of the incest stories 
which described bad acts far worse than the allegations in our case, Appellant asserts that 
the danger of unfair prejudice far outweighed whatever legitimate probative value the 
content may have had. Therefore, while Appellant asserts that the existence of the 
stories should not even have been admitted, if it was, it should have stopped there and 
the content not been provided to the jury. 
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IV. 
MR. ROSSIGNOL WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT 
ADMITTED EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD EARLIER RULED INADMISSIBLE AND 
THE DEFENSE RELIED ON THE PRE-TRIAL RULING 
A. Standard ofreview. 
Where a defendant claims his right to due process was violated, the appellate 
court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence, but 
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts found. State v. 
Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct.App. 2001). 
B. The motions and rulings court's rulings 
After the defense rested, the state requested to be able to admit the audio and 
transcript of the September 28 th interview of S.R. by Detective Lehmbecker (and Rhonda 
Shultz) which the court had previously ruled was not admissible. (Tr. p. 1534-1536.) 
The state argued that it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but 
rather, to rebut the defendant's argument that S.R. fabricated the story. (Tr. p. 1536.) 
The state argued that the defendant was maintaining that S.R.'s use of terms "hole" and 
"massage" were not coincidental, but that she had learned those words from her half 
sister C.B. in Wyoming. (R. p. 1536.) Therefore, according to the state, it should be 
able to show that she used a lot more words during her interview with Detective 
Lehmbecker. (Tr. p. 1536.) The defense strenuously objected and much argument 
ensued, but the court ultimately allowed the admission of the transcript (but not the 
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audio). The court also issued a limiting instruction admonishing the jury that it may 
consider the evidence only for the purpose of "evidence of the words and phrases S.R. 
used to describe sexual parts of the body and actions involving those parts of the body." 
(R. p. 1209.) However, the court also said that it was concerned that the jury may 
consider it for the truth of the matter even though it told them not to. (Tr. p. 1544.) 
The defense filed a motion to reconsider with memorandum in support the next 
morning. The memorandum in support pointed out that in the Memorandum Decision 
of March 7, 2007, the court ruled that S .R.' s statements to Clara Hill would be admitted 
but not the interview with Detective Lehmbecker. (R. p. 1174.) The defense continued: 
It was clear to the parties going into this trial that the evidence contained 
in the September [28] interview was inadmissible, barring defense actions. 
II. The defendant was denied due process by the admission of the 
evidence. 
In the last trial the court admitted [S.R.'s] prior consistent statements from 
the September (28] interview, holding the defense had opened the door to 
such testimony by suggesting recent fabrication. The court warned that the 
defense could again open the door to the admission of this evidence by 
making a similar suggestion in this trial. The court also warned that the 
defense could open the door by alleging the investigation was not 
conducted properly. Essentially, the court ruled it was keeping out the 
September (28] interview, but a defense mis-step would result in its 
admission. 
As a result, and in reliance on the court's warning, the defense shaped its 
case around the March 7 order. When (S.R.'s] testimony differed at this 
trial from her prior testimony, the defendant did not challenge her. No 
testimony was elicited to suggest that best practices were not followed in 
this trial. This was done in order to comply with the court's order and 
remain within the boundaries outlined by the court. 
Defendant's due process rights have been violated by the admission of the 
exhibit. Defendant relied on the court's March 7, 2007 ruling and did not 
open any door that might lead to the admission of evidence of the 
September (28] interview. Yet despite his compliance, that evidence has 
been admitted, contrary to the court's prior ruling and absent any 
affirmative act on the part of the defendant. 
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The defendant contends it is similarly unfair to him [referring to the 
court's ruling that it would be unfair to judge S.R. 's credibility based only 
on her now wooden account] to allow this exhibit at this late stage of the 
trial after he has complied with the court's pretrial ruling and sacrificed 
strategies and his ability to confront his accusers in reliance on that ruling, 
and when he took no actions at trial to open any doors that would allow 
evidence such as is contained in state's exhibit 25A. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, p. 2-3. (R. p. 1174-
1175.) 
The defense continued by arguing that the state waived its ability to present such 
evidence by not raising the issue pre-trial. (R. p. 1175.) The state had never previously 
advanced this rationale for admission of the evidence even though the defense had made 
the exact same arguments in the previous trial and so could reasonably be expected to do 
so again. (R. p. 1175-1176.) In other words, this is not a situation in which 
unanticipated testimony at trial required the state to respond in rebuttal. (R. p. 1176.) 
Finally, the defense argued that the state's rationale for admission does not actually 
justify its admission, because the jury already knew that S.R. used many different words 
in describing the alleged conduct other than those from Wyoming. (R. p. 1176-1177.) 
The defense argued that the state is just attempting to get in through the back door what 
was barred from the front and the court's initial ruling should stand. (R. p. 1177.) 
In court, the defense further argued that the reversal of the ruling was a due 
process violation under both the Federal and Idaho State Constitutions and that the 
defendant should be able to present his case in reliance upon pretrial motions without 
having the rules charged at the end of the game for no reason that was apparent at the 
beginning of the trial. (Tr. p. 1560.) Further, it constitutes a violation. of the 
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confrontation clause because the defense forewent much cross-examination of S.R. in 
order to give the court no reason to change its rulings on the admission of evidence. (Tr. 
1560-1561 I.) Even though the court would now allow her to be recalled for the purpose 
of expanding on her testimony, this would create a completely different dynamic which 
wonld not cure the prejudice of having had the confrontation right infringed in this way 
the first time she testified. (Tr. p. 1561.) Also, the defense argued that the in limine 
rulings were the law of the case which should be followed absent any material change in 
circumstances. (Tr. p. 1562.) 
Defense counsel cited to several cases in support of his arguments (incorporated 
by Appellant here). First was DuPont v. Southern Nat. Bank of Houston, 771 F.2d 874, 
880 (5 th Cir. 1985), which found a due process violation where the court granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss but then later granted the plaintiffs motion for partial 
judgment. (Tr. p. 1561-1562.) Next was United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 
986 (10th Cir. 1993), which held in the context of preserving issues for appeal, that the 
parties are entitled to treat an unequivocal in limine ruling as the law of the case and to 
rely on it. (Tr. p. 1562.) Finally, the defense cited to Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum 
& Transport Corp., 334 F.Supp.2d 197, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). This case acknowledged 
that the law of the case doctrine dictates that when a court rules upon an issue, that 
decision continues to govern the same issues in later stages of the case. While the 
doctrine is discretionary and the court is free to modify its own pretrial rulings, courts 
normally decline to re-examine previously decided issues absent compelling 
circumstance. 
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Finally as to the defense arguments, the defense also earlier argued that if the 
only purpose was to show that S.R. used words that are not present in records from 
Wyoming, that can be done in a much simpler fashion through Detective Lehmbecker by 
asking her what words S.R. used. (Tr. p. 1543.) Along these same lines, the defense 
argued that the evidence can be introduced in a way where the prejudicial effect does not 
outweigh the probative value, to wit, without presenting the transcript and audio. (Tr. p. 
1546-1547.) 
The court denied the motion to reconsider. (Tr. p. 1559.) The court stated that it 
did not think its new ruling was inconsistent with the in limine ruling because the 
statements were kept out as substantive evidence. (Tr. p. 1563.) In the first trial the 
statements were admitted as substantive evidence but that is not why they were admitted 
this time, now they are being admitted so the state can rebut the defense. (Tr. p. 1563.) 
"[T]he State is entitled to rebut your defense, and your defense has been and consistently 
has been that she learned about all of this in Wyoming." (R. p. 1563.) 
C. The court erred by changing its pre-trial ruling without a change in circumstance. 
Appellant believes that the error in the court admitting the evidence it had 
previously ruled inadmissible is best shown by the history of the ruling. In its original 
memorandum decision before the first trial, the court held that prior inconsistent 
statements of S.R. were inadmissible unless the defense offers evidence that S.R. recently 
fabricated her account. (R. p. 791.) The court confirmed this in an order after the first 
trial addressing a different matter: 
Whether or not Mr. Rossignol alleges recent fabrication by or improper 
influence on S.R. during the second trial will determine the evidentiary 
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ability of many of the witnesses to testify at that trial. The testimony of 
Clara Hill, Crystal Hanson, Rhonda Schultz, Detective Margaret 
Lembecker, Betty Heidelberger, Linda Ackerman and Lindsay Rausch 
was admissible as prior consistent statements only because Mr. Rossignol 
put at issue whether S.R. had been improperly coached and whether she 
was lying for the first time about certain issues at trial. 
Order, p. 1-2. (R. p. 928-929.) 
After the first trial, the defense brought a motion in limine to exclude the 
statement in question confirming that the court had allowed its admission after certain 
questions during cross-examination of S.R. implied that S.R. had recently been coached. 
(R. p. 945.) The defense then moved that the court should again rule these statements 
inadmissible unless the defense again opens the door to them. (R. p. 945.) 
The State's Memorandum in Support of State's Motions in Limine on Retrial 
provided: "[a]s with the Defendant (Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions in 
Limine on Retrial at 3), the State presumes that the Court's prior evidentiary rulings 
stand, unless specifically stated otherwise by the Court." (R. p. 982-983.) Significantly, 
the state did not oppose the defendant's motion described above in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion's on Retrial. (R. p. 1031-1037.) Rather, the state 
moved in limine for an order admitting the statements pursuant to I.R.E. 804(24). (R. p. 
988-994.) 
In its new Memorandum Decision, the court addressed the I.R.E. 804(24) matter 
at length and held that that the statements to Clara Hill would be admitted but not the 
other statements (including the one in question). The court called them "cumulative 
hearsay without the same inherent indicia of reliability on balance and as such should not 
be admitted." (R. p. 1115.) 
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To summarize, the court first ruled the statement inadmissible but allowed it in 
for a very specific reason in the first trial and warned it would be let in again if the 
defense opened the same door. After the first trial, it then separately ruled the statement 
inadmissible for a different reason. In the second trial, the defense did not open the 
sarne door that had allowed in the statement in the first trial and so the evidence could not 
be admitted for that reason. Nor could it be admitted for the reason asserted by the state 
in its in limine motion. 
Rather, the court picked an entirely new reason never advanced before to admit 
the evidence, to wit, that it rebutted the defense. However, the defense was the sarne as 
before, which is that the allegations were fabricated and that S.R. learned various words 
in Wyoming. Since the court in fact knew what the defense would be, if it was going to 
let the evidence in to rebut it, even if the defense did nothing else to warrant its 
admission, then it should have said so. But instead, the court made two different rulings 
leading the defense to believe that the evidence was inadmissible unless the defendant 
did a particular thing, and then let it in even though the defendant did not do that thing. 
In other words, the position of the court, to wit, that its pre-trial rulings on admissibility 
did not encompass the rebuttal grounds, is disingenuous when the court knew exactly 
what the defense would be and therefore what the state would be rebutting. 
Further, the real damage done is not just the admission of the statement at the end 
of the trial, but also the change in defense tactics throughout the trial. The defense had 
forgone impeachment of S.R. (and not attacked the investigation) so as not to have the 
interview admitted. Contrary to the court's belief, recalling S.R. at this late time in order 
to examine her about what she knew in Wyoming would not remedy the problem. The 
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cross-examination foregone by the defense was just not about Wyoming, it also did not 
impeach her with differences in testimony between the two trials on other matters. So 
the defense would have to call her back to the stand and re-examine her as to her earlier 
answers and then impeach her with her prior testimony. Even if the court would allow 
such a thing with the nine year old witness, as the defense attempted to argue below, this 
is just not the same as if S.R. had been originally cross-examined with regard to these 
other matters. 
Further, the state should not be able to benefit given its role in events. The state 
knew exactly what the defense would be, but never brought up its rebuttal theory of 
admissibility for pre-trial resolution as it did with many other matters. In fact, it did not 
directly oppose the defense motion requesting that the statement not be admitted unless 
the defense opened the door of recent fabrication. Further, in its case in chief, knowing 
exactly what the defense would be, the state could have asked S.R. about what words she 
used in the interview. But it did not, and instead laid in wait until the defense had rested 
(having foregone cross-examination so that the interview would not be admitted) and 
then the state admitted the interview it could not otherwise get into evidence. Finally, 
the state was not simply trying to present to the jury the words that S.R. used, it wanted to 
do it in the way most prejudicial to the defense, by admitting the transcript and audio of 
the interview rather than having the detective describe the words. 
To conclude, the court's earlier rulings were the law of the case which the defense 
should have been able to rely on. Appellant asserts that his due process rights were 
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violated.8 This occurred when the court allowed in evidence that it had previously ruled 
was inadmissible ( and the defense relied on that ruling) when there was no change in 
circumstances justifying the change in decision, such as a new defense that the state 
could not anticipate. Further, Appellant asserts that the district court also erred by 
denying the motion to reconsider for all the reasons as argued in the trial court and in this 
brief. 
V. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE CHILD-RELATED 
COMMUNICATIONS EXCEPTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGIST-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE AND SO PROHIBITED 
EXAMINATION OF THE VICTIM'S PSYCHOLOGIST 
Before the first trial, the defense had subpoenaed the records of S.R.'s treating 
psychologist, Dr. Von Moltke, and later attempted to question her at a hearing to 
determine whether S.R. was competent to be a witness. (Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 9-11.) The 
defense argued that her records (and communications) were not privileged under l.R.E. 
503(d)(4), which provided an exception to the psychotherapist/patient privilege for child 
related communications. (Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 12.) The state argued that exception would be 
more applicable to an adult's disclosures, rather than a child meeting with her therapist. 
(Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 14.) The defense argued that the rule could have been written that 
way, but was not and contains no such limitation. (Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 16-17.) The court 
8 In violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution. 
38 
took this question (and another) under advisement. (Tr. 11/8/2006, p. 20.) 
At a hearing on November 15, 2006, the court held that it interpreted the rule as 
being aimed at permitting people who are aware of abuse to repo1i it, as opposed to 
waiving the privilege as to treatment once the abuse has been identified. (Tr. p. 8.) The 
court recognized the competing public policy interests, but opined that interpreting the 
rule as defense counsel did would have a chilling effect on effective treatment. (Tr. p. 
I 1.) The court ruled that the defense could not examine the treating psychologist 
regarding any treatment that she's given or any conclusions that she has drawn that she 
thinks are necessary for that treatment, nor any communications she has received from 
S.R. (Tr. p. 12.) 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 503, Physician and psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
provides as follows in relevant part: 
(b) General Rules of Privilege. 
(2) Criminal Action. A patient has a privilege in a criminal action to refuse 
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the 
patient's mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug 
addiction, among the patient, the patient's psychotherapist, and persons 
who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of 
the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. 
( d) Exceptions. 
(4) Child Related Communications. There is no privilege under this rule in 
a criminal or civil action or proceeding as to a communication relevant to 
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an issue concerning the physical, mental or emotional condition of or 
injury to a child, or concerning the welfare of a child including, but not 
limited to the abuse, abandonment or neglect of a child. 
l.R.E. 503. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the interpretation of the rules of 
evidence is a question oflaw subject to free review. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 119, 
29 P.3d 949, 955 (2001). In Young, the district court had held that a criminal 
defendant's psychological report was privileged and that the child related 
communications exception of I.R.E. 503 ( and I.R.E. 517, licensed counselor-client 
privilege) did not apply. The Supreme Court held: 
The district court ruled that the above exceptions did not apply "to 
counseling where a patient is earnestly trying to recognize and solve 
personal problems and a child is not in immediate or pending danger 
concerning his or her welfare." Neither exception includes any provision 
limiting its application in cases where the defendant "is earnestly trying to 
recognize and solve personal problems," nor does either exception require 
that the child be "in immediate or pending danger concerning his or her 
welfare." Both exceptions by their terms apply "to a communication 
relevant to an issue concerning ... the abuse ... of a child." If Young made 
any communication to his psychologist or counselor that is relevant to an 
issue concerning the allegation of sexual abuse that is the basis of the 
charge in this case, such communication is not privileged under either 
Rule 503 or Rule 517 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The district court's 
order to the contrary is reversed. 
Id., p. 119. 
Our case is the same. Despite the district court's opinions as to public policies 
which may be served by deciding that the exception did not apply, the rule simply does 
not include any provision limiting the application of the child related communications to 
only disclosures of those perpetrating abuse on a child. 
The language of the rule is plain and not ambiguous and the exception to the 
exception found by the district court simply does not appear in the rule. As applied to 
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statutory construction, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Gonzales, 144 
Idaho 775, 171 P.3d 266 (Ct.App. 2007): 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is 
no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of 
statutory interpretation. 
Id., 171 P.3d at p. 271 (internal citations omitted). 
Since the language of the rule in question is plain and unambiguous, there is no 
occasion to resort to any interpretation of it. The rule which allows disclosure of the 
communications concerning S.R. is rational and, while the district court may have 
wanted a different result, the result of the rule as written is certainly not absurd. While 
effective treatment of children is a public policy interest, as defense counsel argued, it is 
also in the child's best interest to have the truth of these cases determined, and it is not in 
a child's best interest to have her father found to have molested her when he did not do it. 
(Tr. p. 10-11.) 
Therefore, the district court erred when it refused to allow S.R. 's psychologist to 
testify. Since the psychologist's testimony would go both to trial evidence and the 
determination of whether S.R. was even competent to testify, the convictions should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
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VI. 
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL 
Appellant asserts that the errors discussed above combine to constitute 
cumulative error. In State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct.App. 2007), the 
Court of Appeals explained: 
Having identified multiple errors, we would normally address whether, 
pursuant to I.C.R. 52, each of these errors was harmless. However the 
cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is 
an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself may be harmless, 
but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of 
the defendant's constitutional right to due process. In order to find 
cumulative error, this Court must conclude there is merit to more than one 
of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when aggregated, 
denied the defendant a fair trial. 
Id., 171 P.3d at 1289 (footnote and internal citations omitted). 
The multiple errors in this trial have all been discussed at length above. 
Therefore, they will not be unnecessarily repeated in this section, but Appellant will 
simply request that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial 
because of the cumulative error. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for all of the reasons as stated above, Appellant respectfully requeJts 
this Court reverse his conv~ns and remand this matter for a new tria 
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